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Introduction
Most of the existing literature on oligopoly theory (either static or dynamic) assumes linear inverse demand functions, as this, in addition to simplifying calculations, also ensures both concavity and uniqueness of the equilibrium, which, in general, wouldn't be warranted in presence of convex demand systems (see [14] and [8] , inter alia). However, the use of linear demand function is in sharp contrast with the standard microeconomic approach to consumer behaviour, where the widespread adoption of Cobb-Douglas preferences (or their log-linear a¢ ne transformation) yields hyperbolic inverse demand functions. The same applies to the so-called quasi-linear utility function, concave in consumption and linear in money, that again yields a convex demand system. Indeed, both preference structures share the common property of producing isoelastic demand functions. 1 In fact, this is sometimes openly referred to in the …eld of industrial organization, where researchers mention the opportunity of dealing with non-linear demand curves, and then promptly leave it aside for the sake of tractability. 2 Additionally, the econometric approach to demand theory has produced the highest e¤orts to building up a robust approach to the estimation of non-linear individual and market inverse demand functions, yielding a large empirical evidence in this direction. 3 With these considerations in mind, it appears desirable to investigate the bearings of non-linear demand systems on the performance of …rms operating in oligopolistic markets, using thus a setup with solid microfoundations corroborated by robust empirical evidence, even though this is a costly approach in terms of analytical tractability. 1 For a thorough illustration of these issues in consumer theory, see the classical textbooks: [7] and [27] , inter alia.
2 A noteworthy example in this respect is [23] (pp. 53-54), using quasi-linear utility function to de…ne the concept of consumer surplus. 3 See [15] , [25] and [26] , inter alia. With speci…c reference to di¤erential games, the use of linear inverse demand functions (jointly with either linear or quadratic cost functions) allows for the closed-form solution of the feedback equilibrium through the Bellman equation of the representative …rm, as the model takes a linearquadratic form and therefore one can stipulate that the corresponding candidate value function is also linear-quadratic. However, there is no particular reason to believe that a linear function describes correctly virtually any market demand in the real world, and therefore it is of primary interest to design, if possible, closed-form solutions of market games with non-linear demand functions. To the best of our knowledge, the only existing examples of di¤erential oligopoly games with non-linear market demand are in [5] , [11] and [18] . The …rst one uses a non-linear demand à la Anderson and Engers ( [1] ) and also investigates horizontal mergers, whereas the second one carries out a pro…tability assessment of small horizontal mergers subject to a sticky price dynamics. The third one employs a hyperbolic demand with sticky prices (as in [24] and [13] ) as well, but leaves the merger issue out of the picture. Other non linear-quadratic structures are investigated by [16] and [17] . 4 The aim of this paper is to illustrate a way out of the aforementioned problem, o¤ered by dynamic game theory. We are going to illustrate a dynamic Cournot model where …rms (i) accumulate capacity à la Ramsey (1928), (ii) bear an instantaneous cost of holding any given capacity, and (iii) discount future pro…ts at a constant rate. The main results are threefold.
1. First, we determine the feedback information structure of the di¤eren-tial game both over in…nite and …nite horizon, solving in closed form the related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman systems of equations when the accumulation dynamics is linear and the accumulation cost is a polynomial function of a generic degree of the …rm's capital endowment.
When the accumulation follows a linear growth dynamics, the resulting feedback equilibrium coincides with the open-loop equilibrium, hence it is indeed subgame perfect.
2. Secondly, we investigate the standard Ramsey Ak model where the inverse demand is a hyperbolic curve. By applying the above results, we are able to completely characterize the equilibrium structure. Some results on feasibility of states and controls and on the comparison between the …rms' pro…ts in the static and in the dynamic frameworks are also featured.
3. Finally, we use it to investigate the pro…t (or, private) incentive towards horizontal mergers, to …nd that taking a dynamic perspective widens the range of privately feasible mergers. In particular, the form of the demand curve is crucial to allow for pro…table mergers to take place in all setups: 5 That is, the presence of discounting, depreciation and a cost associated to holding capacity increases the …rms' willingness to merge horizontally, for any admissible merger size. Any merger, of course, has undesirable consequences on consumer surplus and ultimately for welfare (at least in this model, where the e¢ ciency defense is not operating).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 features the basic concepts on the static game, and subsequently the complete calculation and the related properties of the feedback information structure of the di¤erential game with capacity accumulation over in…nite and …-nite horizons. In Section 3 two applications are taken into account and characterized: the Cournot-Ramsey di¤erential game and the analysis of pro…tability of horizontal mergers. Section 4 incorporates our conclusions and further possible developments. 
(1) is the outcome of the constrained maximum problem of a representative consumer endowed with a log-linear utility function
where m is a numeraire good whose price is normalised to one. The budget constraint establishes that the consumer's nominal income Y must be large enough to cover the expenditure, so that Y p(Q)Q + m: The representative consumer is supposed to solve the following:
Solving the above problem, one obtains indeed the hyperbolic inverse demand function (1), where a = 1 > 0. On the supply side, production entails a total cost C i = cq i ; where c > 0 is a constant parameter measuring marginal production cost. Market competition takes place à la Cournot-Nash; therefore, …rm i chooses q i so as to maximise pro…ts i = (p(Q) c) q i : This entails that the following …rst order conditions must be satis…ed (given their form, it is not necessary to assume interior solutions):
where
The associated second order condition:
is always met when q i > 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; N . Then, imposing the symmetry condition on all outputs, i.e. q i = q j = q, one obtains the individual Cournot-Nash equilibrium output q CN = a (N 1) N 2 c ; yielding
If the N …rms were operating under perfect competition, then p = c and therefore q = a N c :
It is apparent that the above solutions (i.e., both the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the perfectly competitive equilibrium) are well-de…ned and feasible for all c > 0:
In the remainder of the paper, we will turn our attention to a di¤erential game where the demand structure is the same as here. We will separately investigate the in…nite horizon and …nite horizon cases.
Feedback solutions of the di¤erential game on an in…nite horizon
We are going to consider a market existing over t 2 [0 ; +1) ; and which is served by N …rms producing a homogeneous good. Let q i (t) 2 (0; +1) de…ne the quantity sold by …rm i at time t: Firms compete à la Cournot, the demand function at time t being:
In order to produce, …rms bear linear instantaneous costs C i (t) = cq i (t) ; where C > 0. Moreover, they must accumulate capacity or physical capital k i (t) 2 [0; +1) over time. If we denote with y i (t) the output produced by …rm i at time t; we assume that k i a¤ects the production of y i in the sense that @y i @k i > 0. Capital accumulates as a result of intertemporal relocation of unsold output y i (t) q i (t): 6 This can be interpreted in two ways. The …rst consists in viewing this setup as a corn-corn model, where unsold output is reintroduced in the production process. The second consists in thinking of a two-sector economy where there exists an industry producing the capital input which can be traded against the …nal good at a price equal to one (for further discussion, see [5] ). Unlike the standard macroeconomic approach to growth models in a Ramsey fashion, here we will allow for the presence of an instantaneous cost of holding installed capacity. This cost will be i (k i (t)); possibly asymmetric across …rms. In the remainder, we will refer to @ i @k i as a measure of the opportunity cost of a unit of capacity. We will employ k i (t) as the i-th state variable subject to the following dynamic constraints:
function a¤ecting the growth dynamics of capital. The i-th …rm's strategic variable is q i (t); while the i-th …rm's state variable is k i (t):
Assuming all …rms discount pro…ts at the same constant rate 0; the problem of …rm i is to choose the output level q i (t) so as to maximise its own discounted ‡ow of pro…ts (from now on, we will omit time arguments whenever possible):
Call k i0 = k. Denoting with V i (k) the i-th optimal value function for (8), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) system of equations reads as follows:
for all i = 1; : : : ; N . Note that because J i only depends on the i-th capital, in (9) the …rst order partial derivatives of V i with respect to the remaining state variables do not appear. To proceed with the analytical solution of the feedback problem, we are going to introduce suitable symmetry conditions: one is q i = q j for all i 6 = j; saying that the equilibrium output must be symmetric across all …rms. The assumption of symmetry across capitals states that, from the standpoint of a generic …rm i, the rivals'capacities (and therefore also their weights in the value function) must be symmetric when the respective growth dynamics and cost structures are equal.
Proposition 1.
Assuming symmetry across all variables, the HJB equation of the problem is given by:
Proof. Maximizing the r.h.s. of (9) with respect to q i yields:
then, by assuming symmetry on the relevant variables and functions, i.e. q 1 = : : : = q N = q, V 1 = : : :
we have that (11) yields the following expression for the optimal strategy q :
which must be plugged into (9) to achieve:
Corollary 2. (10) admits the following family of solutions in any interval properly contained in the set fk 2 R + j G(k) 6 = 0g:
where e C is a constant depending on the initial conditions of (10).
Expression (13) is useful to characterize the standard cases. In particular, when the capital's production function is linear and it does not involve …xed costs in absence of capital, it suggests us the following result: (10) is an m-th degree polynomial in k as well.
Proof. By assumption, call G(k) = k and (k) = P m l=0 l k l . Replacing such functions in (13) yields:
hence the solution corresponding to the choice e C = 0 is an m-th degree polynomial in k.
By plugging the solution into (12) , it follows that: Corollary 4. If the assumptions of Proposition 3 hold, the optimal feedback strategy is given by:
2.3 Feedback solutions of the di¤erential game on a …nite horizon
On a …nite horizon [t; T ], where 0 t < T < 1, the HJB system of equations of our problem takes the following form:
where V i depends on both k and initial time t. Di¤erently from the in…nite horizon case, we must additionally take into account the transversality conditions on all V i : lim
Proposition 5. If G(k) is linear, G(0) = 0 and (k) is an m-th degree polynomial in k, then the system (15) admits the following solution:
Proof. As in Proposition 3, call G(k) = k and (k) = P m l=0 l k l . The maximization of the r.h.s. of (15) yields:
then, by assuming symmetry on the relevant variables and functions, i.e.
we have that (18) yields the following expression for the optimal strategy q :
which must be plugged into (15) to achieve (the steps are analogous to those in Proposition 3, so we omit them):
We guess a function of the following kind for V (k; t):
where A l (t) 2 C 1 ([t; T ]) and the transversality conditions are A l (T ) = 0 for all l = 0; 1; : : : ; m. Plugging (21) into (20), we obtain:
subsequently, all the coe¢ cients of the powers of k are supposed to vanish, giving rise to the following dynamic system: 8 > > > > < > > > > :
By employing the transversality conditions, we achieve the following unique solutions:
for all l = 1; : : : ; m. Finally, substituting the found solutions in (21), we obtain the optimal value function in closed form:
Corollary 6. If the assumptions of Proposition 5 hold, the optimal feedback strategy is given by:
3 Applications
The Cournot-Ramsey game
In this well-known example, in order to produce, …rms must accumulate capacity or physical capital k i (t) over time. We chose to consider the kinematic equations for capital accumulation as in Ramsey ([21] ), i.e. the following dynamic constraints:
where Ak i (t) = y i (t) denotes the output produced by …rm i at time t and > 0 denotes the decay rate of capital, equal across …rms. I.e., this is the familiar Ak version of the Ramsey model. The related cost will be i (t) = bk i (t); with b 0; representing the aforementioned opportunity cost of a unit of capacity.
, we can apply all the results collected in the previous Section. In particular, if we posit the following:
then the application of formulas (13), (14), (22) and (23) respectively entail:
In…nite horizon:
Finite horizon:
In order to ensure the feasibility (i.e., the positivity) of such strategies, we need suitable parametric assumptions: Proposition 7. In the in…nite horizon case, if one of the following conditions:
Proof. Both conditions are trivially satis…ed. In particular, in both cases we have to assume A > to ensure accumulation of capital (otherwise _ k i (t) would be negative at all t).
Moreover, here q (k) is constant whereas k (t) grows unbounded in that A > . We can easily compare the optimal output with the one in the Cournot-Nash static setup: Proposition 8. In the in…nite horizon case, we have that:
Proof. It su¢ ces to evaluate the di¤erence between outputs:
In the …nite horizon case, the situation is di¤erent and we need to establish a time interval over which q (k; t) is feasible. However, note that at t = T the optimal strategy coincides with the Cournot-Nash optimal strategy: q(k; T ) = q CN .
Proposition 9.
In the …nite horizon case we have that:
is feasible for each t 2 ( e t; T ), where
Proof. We are going to consider the two di¤erent cases: If A < + , then the numerator is negative, hence we have to ensure that the denominator is negative too:
If the r.h.s. is negative, i.e. A < b c + + , q (k; t) is positive for all t 2 [0; T ). If the r.h.s. is positive, then:
hence if we call e t = T + 1
T ).
Subsequently, consider A > + , we have to prove the positivity of the denominator of q (k; t): is decreasing and it reaches q CN at the instant T .
Corollary 10. Since the di¤erential game at hand is a linear state one 8 , the open-loop equilibrium is subgame perfect as it coincides with the feedback equilibrium q (k; t) yielded by the Bellman equation. Moreover, this would hold true also in the more general case where y i (t) = f (k i (t)) ; with f 0 (k i (t)) > 0 and f 00 (k i (t)) 0: That is, state-linearity is not necessary to yield subgame perfection in a Cournot-Ramsey game. For more on this issue, see [4] and [6] .
If we substitute q (k; t) in the dynamic constraint (24), we can also achieve the expression of the optimal state k (t):
8 < :
whose unique solution is given by:
(25) Now the joint feasibility of q (t) and k (t) can be evaluated: 8 A linear state game is one where, if we call H i ( ) the i-th …rm's Hamiltonian function, we have that: games, see [10] (ch. 7), inter alia.
Proposition 11. Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 9, if q (t) is feasible and if
for all t 2 (0; T ], then k (t) is feasible as well.
Proof. It immediately follows from the positivity of q (t) and from the expression (25) .
The next Proposition provides the exact expression of k (t):
The optimal state of the Cournot-Ramsey game is given by the following function:
Proof. The explicit calculation of (25) needs the calculation of the related integral:
where C 1 = b + c(A ) and C 2 = e ( A )T . We have that:
Then, applying the change of variable x = e s , leading to the change of di¤erential ds = dx x , we obtain:
Finally, plugging (27) into (25) yields the complete expression (26)of the optimal capital:
Given (26), we can evaluate k (T ), i.e. the terminal value of capital at the end of the time interval 9 :
If we call = (q (T ); k (T )) the pro…t function evaluated at the terminal instant T , we are able to compare it with the pro…t function CN = (Q CN ) evaluated at the steady state in the static Cournot problem as shown in Subsection 2.1. Namely, we have that:
Proposition 13. Under the hypotheses of Propositions 9 and 11, if q (t) and k (t) are both feasible at all t 2 [0; T ], then the Cournot-Nash equilibrium pro…t is larger than the Ramsey-Cournot equilibrium level at the terminal instant.
Proof. It su¢ ces to consider the di¤erence:
which is strictly negative by the feasibility of k (t) at all instants, meaning that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium pro…t exceeds the Ramsey-Cournot terminal pro…t.
Remark 14.
It is worth noting that comparing the two optimal strategies in the static and in the dynamic cases, one immediately sees that the presence of capital accumulation in the dynamic game plays a key role in opening the way towards a solution to the indeterminacy issue a¤ecting the static game as the marginal production cost c of the consumption good drops to zero. Essentially, if c = 0, no solution exists for the static game if no strategy space is compact, whereas in the di¤erential game with capacity accumulation q (k; t) is well-de…ned and feasible under suitable parametric conditions even when the marginal cost is zero, both over …nite and in…nite horizons. Propositions 8 and 13 suggest that at the subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game the representative …rm may produce either more or less but she earns higher pro…ts when she plays the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the static game, irrespective of the levels of marginal cost, opportunity cost, intensity of capacity accumulation growth and intertemporal discount rate.
Having characterised the subgame perfect equilibrium of the di¤erential game, we can now proceed to the analysis of its application to horizontal mergers.
Horizontal mergers
To illustrate the advantages of our approach to the feedback solution of the di¤erential oligopoly game à la Ramsey, we illustrate here its applicability to the analysis of the private pro…tability of a horizontal merger, and its welfare appraisal.
As is well known, a lively debate has taken place on this topic from the 1980's, based upon static oligopoly models. A thorough overview of it is outside the scope of the present paper, and it will su¢ ce to recollect a few essential aspects. Examining a Cournot industry with constant returns to scale, in [22] it is shown that a large proportion of the population of …rms has to participate in the merger in order for the latter to be pro…table. In particular, a striking result of their analysis is that, in the triopoly case, bilateral mergers are never pro…table. Enriching the picture by allowing for the presence of convex variable costs and …xed costs, one may …nd a way out of this puzzle (in particular, see [20] and [12] ). Now take the static Cournot game and examine the incentive for M > 1 …rms to merge horizontally, out of the initial N: After the merger (if it does take place), there remain N M + 1 …rms. If we call CN (j) the pro…t of a …rm in the Cournot static game among j …rms, without distinguishing the original ones from those generated by the merger, we can prove the following: Proposition 15. In the static Cournot game with hyperbolic inverse demand, the merger is pro…table if and only if
Proof. Pro…tability holds when
It is easily checked that, contrary to [22] , if N = 3 and M = 2; the merger is pro…table.
On the other hand, if we consider the terminal outcome of the di¤er-ential game over …nite horizon, in compliance with the above notation, we can assess the pro…t incentive scheme for an M -…rm merger in the dynamic framework too.
If we consider the assumptions of Proposition 9 to ensure the feasibility of the optimal strategy on [0; T ], we can state the following: Proof. The pro…tability of a merger in the Cournot-Ramsey game is measured by
where we called k l (T ) the capital at time T under circumstances where a merger of l …rms took place. In order to simplify the notation, call where we exploited the inequality N 2 > M (N M + 1) 2 . Hence, this completes the proof.
Taken together, these facts entail that the interval wherein the M -…rm merger is pro…table may be the same in the dynamic setup and in the static one, given that the measure of output productivity A is small enough.
The examination of the welfare consequences of a merger is omitted, as it goes without saying that any merger would diminish social welfare, both in the static as well as in the dynamic setting. This is trivially due to the fact that the damage caused to consumer surplus always outweighs the increase in industry pro…ts.
Possible future developments of our …ndings consist in the analysis of the feedback information structure of further di¤erential oligopoly games endowed with a hyperbolic inverse demand function, possibly in presence of more complex dynamic constraints and in asymmetric frameworks.
